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Why do some countries undergo regime changes despite legitimacy crises, while in others
de-legitimation dramatically challenges democratic and non-democratic regimes? Post-
Communist transformation in Russia can be viewed as a ‘‘natural experiment’’ in legit-
imacy’s changing role during regime change. The de-legitimation of the Soviet political
regime greatly contributed to the overthrow of Communist rule. However, although the
post-Communism system had multiple troubles which led to the newly-emerged regime’s
lack of legitimacy, this has not caused major anti-system protests. Still, the legitimacy of
Russia’s current regime is not deeply rooted among the masses, and is based upon speciﬁc
rather than diffuse support for the status quo. The article reconsider the analysis of the role
of post-Soviet legitimacy (or lack thereof) in the process of regime changes through the
prism of the ‘‘resigned acceptance’’ model within Hirschman’s framework of ‘‘exit, voice,
and loyalty’’. The author will focus on the dynamics of public opinion and political
behavior in the 1990s–2000s and analyze the impact of the ‘‘legacy of the past,’’ regime
performance, and political elites and institutions in strengthening and/or challenging the
existing status quo in Russian politics.
Copyright  2010, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.Why do some countries undergo major regime changes
despite legitimacy crises, while in others de-legitimation
dramatically challenges states and regimes, if not the very
existence of these polities? Conventional scholarly wisdom
holds that political legitimacy is a necessary condition for
political order and successful performance in any given
nation. In many instances, legitimacy crises have caused or
triggered the breakdown of both democratic and authori-
tarian regimes.1 However, some states and regimes haveskevich for valuable
nce.
Research Center, Hanyang Universurvived or transformed themselves even against the
background of severe legitimacy crises, lack of public
conﬁdence in basic political and social institutions, and
deep mistrust between citizens and the state. These
‘‘success stories’’, even though they are relatively rare in the
contemporary world, became possible under certain
conditions which deserve further exploration.
In this respect, the post-Communist transformation in
Russia could be viewed as a ‘‘natural experiment’’ in the
changing role of legitimacy and de-legitimation during
regime change. The Soviet experience was unique in the
world history given the magnitude of hardships and
repressions that Russian people faced, especially under
Stalin. No wonder that the Soviet Union, especially in
1970–1980s faced with de-legitimation of its political
regime, which greatly contributed to the overthrow of
Communist rule and the break-up of the Soviet state itself.
However, although the post-Communist system hadsity. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved. Peer review under
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regime of legitimacy, this has not caused major anti-system
protests. Despite evidence of public discontent and steady
support of the Communist past among Russia’s citizens,2 it
was elite reconﬁguration which caused the trajectory of
post-Communist regime change in Russia, while the role of
mass support (or lack thereof) was secondary at the best. At
the level of political demand, Russia’s citizens have more or
less passively adapted to political and economic changes
rather than resisting them. At the supply level, the lack of
viable alternatives to the status quo diminished political
opportunities for protests. In the end, successful economic
performance and the consolidation of the state in the
2000s have increased popular support for Russia’s political
regime andmight lead to the rise of its legitimacy, although
it is not deeply rooted among the masses and is based upon
speciﬁc rather than diffuse support for the status quo. In
short, over the last twenty years Russia moved from one
(consolidated but illegitimate) authoritarian regime to
another (not yet fully consolidated and not yet legitimate)
despite legitimacy crises. But why and howwas it possible?
What lessons should be learned from Russia’s late-Soviet
and post-Communist experience? And can we expect
Russia’s new political regime to gain legitimacy over the
long haul?
This article seeks to reconsider the role of legitimacy
crises during regime change, analyzing Russia’s recent
experience as a case study. First, I shall develop a frame-
work of analysis based upon Hirschman’s well-known
‘‘exit, voice, and loyalty’’ typology of reactions to crises.
Then, I shall focus on the constellation of factors which
contributed to the preference for ‘‘exit’’ rather than ‘‘voice’’
in post-Communist Russian politics. In particular, I will
examine the impact of the Soviet legacy, the role of political
elites and institutions, and changing perceptions of regime
performance in strengthening and/or challenging the
status quo in Russian politics. The dynamics of public
opinion and political behavior in Russia in the 1990s–2000s
will be analyzed through the prism of the ‘‘resigned
acceptance’’ model,3 which argues that the popular support
for Russia’s current political regime is based upon the
rejection of alternatives to the status quo. Finally, I will
discuss the possible challenges of dis-equilibration and
their political consequences as well as the implications of
Russia’s experience.1. Legitimacy and its alternatives
If legitimacy is ‘‘the capacity of the system to engender
and maintain the belief that the existing political institu-
tions are most appropriate ones for the society’’,4 then its
necessity to the survival of a political regime is clearly
important. If one compared the survival of political regimes
with the survival of ﬁrms on the markets, regime legiti-
macymight be regarded as the functional equivalent of two2 See Rose, Mishler, and Munro (2006).
3 See Rose, Mishler, and Munro (2006).
4 See (Lipset, 1960, p. 64).basic practices of economic agents: investments and risk
insurance. On the one hand, a regime’s legitimacy is similar
to a ﬁrm’s capital stock and might be viewed as a basis for
investment in a regime’s effectiveness, which could bring
the regime long-term capital gains due to the positive
feedback between legitimacy and effectiveness.5 On the
other hand, a regime’s legitimacy is also similar to risk
insurance, which could provide regimes with at least some
guarantees against bankruptcy even if they perform poorly
in the eyes of their citizens. Regime legitimacy (both
democratic and non-democratic) brings risk insurance if
citizens support the ‘‘existing political institutions’’ (i.e., the
status quo) not only because the regime is effective, but
also because they trust in its institutions. The natures of
these two functions of legitimacy are rather different, as
David Easton pointed out in his analysis of the distinctions
between ‘‘speciﬁc’’ and ‘‘diffuse’’ types of political support.6
Still, they are closely linked and mutually reinforce each
other: while speciﬁc support is sensitive to popular
perceptions of regime performance, diffuse support oper-
ates irrespectively of it. Regimes (or, rather, governments)
could invest both their diffuse and speciﬁc support into
increase of their performance, but only diffuse support will
bring risk insurance. Well-established democratic regimes
tend to rely upon both types of political support, but the
legitimacy of authoritarian regimes rests only on their
speciﬁc support. However, during the process of regime
change the emergence (or non-emergence) of political
support for a regime is a more complex phenomenon, and
building legitimacy in newly-emerged regimes (whether
democratic or not) depends upon a constellation of factors.
They include not only mass values and attitudes (mostly
inherited from the past) but also popular perceptions of
both the current and previous regime’s performance, and
the viability of alternatives to the status quo regime. In
other words, while citizens choose whether or not the new
regime deserves their legitimate support, governments
have to preserve the new regime by investing either in the
regime’s performance (as Western Germany did after
World War II) or (especially if they are unable to achieve
success on this front) in diminishing the alternatives.
Certainly, not many newly-emerged regimes can
successfully build their legitimacy from scratch, and some
well-established regimes face losing their legitimacy for
various reasons. But the popular reaction to a regime’s loss
of legitimacy depends not only upon (1) citizens’ support
for the status quo regime (be it speciﬁc or diffuse), but also
upon (2) popular support for alternatives to the status quo.
Juan J. Linz captured the relative nature of legitimacy vis-
a`-vis its alternatives by deﬁning legitimacy as ‘‘the belief
that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing
political institutions are better than any others that might be
established and that they therefore can demand
obedience’’7 (italics mine – V.G.). From this perspective,
even if a regime lacks legitimacy, citizens will shift their
preferences only if the alternatives are more attractive.5 See Lipset (1960), Linz (1978, pp.18–21), Beetham (1991).
6 See Easton (1975).
7 See Linz (1978, p.18).
Table 1
Popular support and possible reactions of citizens to political regimes.
Support for alternatives to the status quo
Low High
Support for status quo
regimes
High Stable loyalty (legitimacy) Unstable loyalty
Low Exit (resigned acceptance) Voice (illegitimacy)
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so-legitimate status quo regime. Otherwise, there is little
chance that citizens will challenge even a status quo regime
with little popular support. In this case, the status quo
regime will survive simply by default, due to the ‘‘resigned
acceptance’’ of its citizens.8 Also, if the alternative to the
status quo regime is attractive but the popular support for
the existing regime is high enough, citizens will be unlikely
to challenge the status quo, unless the gains from a regime
change would outweigh the beneﬁts of the status quo. In
this case, a deﬁcit of legitimacy9 means that a regime’s
legitimacy is rather shaky and questionable. Following
Linz,10 who drew parallels between the concept of legiti-
macy and the theory of ‘‘loyalty’’,11 I label these two types of
popular reactions to a political regime’s lack of legitimacy
in Hirschman’s terms as ‘‘voice’’ and ‘‘exit’’, respectively.
Thus, instead of a linear understanding of legitimacy, which
is based upon a continuum – from fully-ﬂedged legitimacy
(i.e., equilibrium of regime support) through its de-legiti-
mization to illegitimacy (i.e., dis-equilibration due to the
lack of regime support),12 I propose the following 2  2
matrix, which better covers the range of citizens’ possible
reactions to political regimes (Table 1):
Contrary to the equilibrium of ‘‘loyalty’’, the upper right
and lower left cells of the matrix represent partial equi-
librium outcomes. The erosion of conﬁdence and trust in
well-established regimes might produce unstable loyalty13
and poses a potential challenge to them because of troubles
with risk insurance and investments. And the ‘‘exit’’, or
‘‘resigned acceptance’’ outcome, in its turn, might result
from the newly-emerged regime’s failure to gain legiti-
macy. Such an outcome does not exclude the possibility
that the regimewill invest, but it makes their risk insurance
very problematic. However, if the regime’s economic,
social, and international environments remain stable, the
trap of ‘‘resigned acceptance’’ could last a long time.
Why do individuals, groups, or nations prefer ‘‘exit’’
rather than ‘‘voice’’ in different settings? Analysts have
focused on institutional incentives for political activism
and passivity as well as on the role of social networks and
organizations, which are usually rooted in the legacy of the
previous regime. Those dynamics increasing the likelihood
of the ‘‘voice’’ option include previous experience of
contentious politics, the existence of networks and8 See Rose, Mishler, and Munro (2006).
9 See Beetham (1991, pp. 18–20).
10 See Linz (1978, pp. 54–55).
11 See Hirschman (1970).
12 See Beetham (1991, p. 35).
13 See Dogan (1997).organizations which are instrumental in resolving collec-
tive action problems, long-term rivalry amongst political
elites and their use of mass mobilization as a tool in this
struggle, and a particular constellation of political institu-
tions. These dynamics encourage selection of the ‘‘voice’’
option by lowering the threshold for anti-regime protests if
the regime lacks legitimacy. However, if the cost of ‘‘exit’’
for individuals, groups, or nations is much lower than the
cost of ‘‘voice’’, they would prefer the former option. At the
same time, the ruling elites can encourage ‘‘exit’’ and/or
discourage ‘‘voice’’ with strategic action, diminishing the
potential for de-legitimation even if loyalty to the status
quo regime is low. As one can see, the experience of post-
Communist Russia has demonstrated the impact of these
factors on citizens’ ‘‘resigned acceptance’’ of the political
regime and its continuity over ﬁfteen years.2. Russia: why ‘‘exit’’ but not ‘‘voice’’?
During the Russian ‘‘triple transition’’ of the 1990s, some
observers expected the simultaneous troubles with regime
change, economic reforms and state- and nation-building
to cause severe popular discontent and to result in regime
illegitimacy, if not its overthrow.14 In fact, the picture was
more complicated. While survey data show deep popular
mistrust and a lack of conﬁdence in the post-Communist
regime, government, and its policies,15 citizens’ actual
political behavior was far from ‘‘voice’’. During the 1996
presidential elections Russians preferred the incumbent
president, Boris Yeltsin, to his rival, Communist leader
Gennady Zyuganov,16 while various protest activities
attracted limited mass participation. In the 1990s, accord-
ing to VTsIOM survey data, not more than 3% of Russians
ever took part in protest actions, some of which were
sponsored by local ofﬁcials or enterprise managers.17 In the
2000s, despite the steep rise in President Vladimir Putin’s
popularity,18 trust in public institutions in Russia has
remained among the lowest in theworld.19 Still, despite the
lack of legitimacy of both previous and new regimes, very
few Russian citizens participated in any anti-regime
activities.
How we can explain this passivity and lack of disobe-
dience despite Russia’s legitimacy crises? Some scholars
refer to peculiarities in Russia’s political culture stemming14 See Offe (1991).
15 See Melville (1998), Levada (2000), Sil and Chen (2004).
16 See McFaul (2001, pp. 289–304).
17 See Levada (2000, p. 496).
18 See Rose and Munro (2002), Rose, Mishler and Munro (2006).
19 See Shlapentokh (2004).
25 See Rose (2000), Colton and McFaul (2003).
26 See Gel’man (2005).
27 See White, Rose, and McAllister (1997), Colton (2000), McFaul
(2001).
28 See Colton (2000), Colton and McFaul (2003).
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prefer to concentrate on a more narrow understanding of
inﬂuence of the ‘‘legacy of the past’’, examining its imme-
diate incentives to certain patterns of political behavior. In
this sense, Russia’s Soviet ‘‘legacy’’ had a very difﬁcult
impact on regime’s legitimacy due to its use of repressive
practices and unsuccessful performance. No wonder that
Soviet citizens became more and more critical toward the
Soviet regime and its major institutions, which lacked both
diffuse and speciﬁc support. At least, by 1980s Russians
largely denied Soviet regime’s legitimacy although sought
no viable alternatives to the status quo.21 The ‘‘Soviet
legacy’’ was also hardly conducive to ‘‘voice.’’ First, the
relative social homogeneity and egalitarianism of the
Soviet period offered few bases for societal cleavages to
form and act subsequently as a mobilizing factor, so they
had a marginal inﬂuence on post-Soviet politics in Russia.
Second, the Soviet regime prevented organized dissent
from spreading: at least, anti-Communist dissidents in
Russia played almost no role in Russian post-Soviet politics
in terms of leadership and organizations. Third, although
state-centered organized activism in Russia (including the
Communist party) was instrumental in terms of selective
incentives for personal promotion,22 it provided little
collective incentives in terms of identity formation. The
organizational legacy of major Soviet-type organizations
(Communist party, trade unions, etc.) was poorly utilized
by their successors, and barely used as a tool of mobiliza-
tion in the post-Soviet period. Fourth, the Soviet period’s
alternative to top-down state-centered activism, or the
bottom-up inter-personal social networks of the Soviet
period, serves as a survival kit for many Russians by
providing them with access to an ‘‘economy of favors’’.23
These networks were instrumental in the post-Soviet
period, involving people in various informal activities. To
summarize: the legacy of the Soviet period ruined regime
legitimacy and discouraged institutional trust while left
little room for ‘‘voice’’ due to the low potential for anti-
regime mass mobilization, but it did encourage a variety of
‘‘exit’’ strategies. Thus, upon the regime’s liberalization and
beginning of market reforms in early 1990s, Russian citi-
zens preferred ‘‘exit’’ in various forms (including domestic
migration and emigration), not getting very involved in
anti-regime activities. In a similar vein, through the lenses
of the ‘‘legacy of the past’’ scholars explained the slug-
gishness of the labor movement during market reforms in
Eastern Europe as compared to Latin America.24
In the 1990s, the elite structure and institutional
arrangements in Russia prevented popular discontent from
turning into political protest. Although in August 1991 and
October 1993 ﬁerce struggles amongst confronting elite
factions caused (a fairly limited) mass involvement, soon
after this the elite fragmented into several competing
cliques at the national and regional levels, weakening the20 See Keenan (1986).
21 See Bahry (1993).
22 See Di Franceisco and Gitelman (1984).
23 See Ledeneva (1998).
24 See Greshkovits (1998).potential for mass mobilization by political elites. The
proliferation of so many competing parties caused opposi-
tions of various colors to fragment (Communists, national-
ists, and liberals).25 These parties had little ground to
cooperate on a ‘‘negative consensus’’ basis and in many
ways often preferred ‘‘exit’’ rather than ‘‘voice’’ them-
selves.26 In addition, Russian voters’ weak party afﬁliation27
and the asymmetry of powers between president, parlia-
ment, and regional governments, as well as election
schedules, posed limits to electoral protest; voter prefer-
ences were unstable over time and divided among various
actors.28 Moreover, in the eyes of general public, the targets
of blame were divided: between federal and regional
governments, between president and parliament, etc. Such
a divided attribution of blame also discouraged various
political entrepreneurs from mobilizing against the
regime.29 The beginning of Vladimir Putin’s presidency in
2000 was a tipping point. On the supply side of Russian
politics, Putinwas able to consolidate Russia’s elites through
an ‘‘imposed consensus’’30 and establish ﬁrm control over
regional elites, political parties,media, NGO’s, etc. Shrinking
the structure of political opportunity led to the ‘‘extinction’’
of political opposition,31 thus eliminating the possibility of
anti-regime mobilization. On the demand side, positive
changes in the popular perception of political leadership
were based on successful economic performance.32 The
tremendous increase in speciﬁc support for the regime not
only lowered the potential for protest but also stabilized the
‘‘resigned acceptance’’ of the status quo regime; even
thoughRussians remained critical of the current regime and
distrusted its institutions, their incentives to challenge it
remained much lower than in the ‘‘roaring nineties’’.33
Finally, post-Soviet Russia’s rulers used their resources
for diminishing (if not eliminating) possible alternatives to
the status quo regime very effectively. As Andrew Wilson
argues in his detailed account of post-Soviet ‘‘virtual poli-
tics’’, the constellation of a powerful but amoral elite,
passive electorate, control over information ﬂows and the
lack of foreign inﬂuence provide fertile grounds for
manipulative political practices to predominate in Russia
and other post-Soviet states.34 While some authors refer to
these practices as ‘‘managed’’35or ‘‘faking’’36 democracy,
they led to the distortion of political competition and to
a dramatic shift in popular preferences, which were
successfully converted into manufactured political
outcomes. The 1996 presidential elections in Russia served
as a case in this point: due to the incumbent campaign’s29 See Javeline (2003).
30 See Gel’man (2003).
31 See Gel’man (2005).
32 See Mishler and Willerton (2003).
33 See Rose, Mishler and Munro (2006).
34 See Andrew Wilson (2005, p. 41).
35 See Colton and McFaul, (2003).
36 See Wilson (2005).
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sin’s spin doctors easily discredited all his challengers
without major resistance. In particular, in campaigning
against Zyuganov the ‘‘negative legitimacy’’38 of the
previous Soviet regime was exploited so successfully that
voters chose to support for Yeltsin as the ‘‘lesser evil’’, even
though popular evaluations of the regime’s performance
were low.39 Similarly, in 1999 Yeltsin’s transfer of presi-
dential power to his successor, Vladimir Putin, was
orchestrated by bomb explosions in Moscow and other
Russian cities. Critics suspected that the security services
had organized the whole series of explosions, but the
media and politicians (who blamed Chechen rebels)
strongly inﬂuenced public opinion. In the eyes of Russians,
Putin – who had demonstrated a decisive and tough
intention to punish terrorists, and had even claimed in an
interview that he would ‘‘murder them in the toilet’’ –
received all the credit. This episode was instrumental in his
sudden rise to power.40 Under Putin, the overall decline of
the independent media and the ‘‘imposed’’ consolidation of
elites opened plenty of opportunities for biased and one-
sided information campaigning, and for major revision – if
not perversion – of public opinion and mass attitudes. In
particular, the elites’ politics of identity was based on
constructing a negative image of the Western democracies
and playing the ‘‘wild card’’ of Russian ethno-nation-
alism.41 The ruling elites’ search for a ‘‘usable past’’ in
Russian history led them to consciously develop a positive
image of the Soviet epoch and especially of Stalin’s policies
among Russia’s youth.42 This was a sharp contrast with the
early 1990s, when some surveys showed that the political
attitudes of Russian citizens were close to their Western
counterparts and thatWestern-style democracy considered
as the most attractive political regime.43 Given the weak-
ness of societal cleavages and the distorted party compe-
tition in Russia, the great impact of the information factor
on popular perceptions and political behavior44 left much
room for various manipulations by the elite, oriented at
legitimizing the status quo regime by de-legitimizing any
alternatives to it.
All three factors – (1) the ‘‘legacy of the Soviet past’’, (2)
the role of elite structure and institutional arrangements,
and (3) the impact of information control on popular
perceptions – were interrelated and mutually reinforced
each other. Alongside the changing socio-economic envi-
ronment, they greatly contributed to the phenomenon of
the pendulum-like swing of authoritarian regimes in Russia
despite legitimacy crises. They deeply affected both public
opinion and political behavior.37 See White, Rose, and McAllister (1997, pp.251–252), McFaul (2001, pp.
300–304).
38 See Huntington, (1991, p. 50).
39 See White, Rose, and McAllister (1997), Colton (2000), Levada (2000),
Sil and Chen (2004).
40 See Colton and McFaul (2003), Wilson (2005).
41 See Levada (2006).
42 See Mendelson and Gerber (2007).
43 See Hahn (1991).
44 See Colton (2000), McFaul (2001), Rose and Munro (2002), Colton and
McFaul (2003).3. From legitimacy crises to ‘‘resigned acceptance’’
As Rudra Sil and Cheng Chen correctly pointed out, both
the Soviet and post-Soviet state in Russia have experienced
problems with legitimacy not only because of the regimes’
poor quality as such (be they democratic or not), but from
their poor infrastructural capacities as a provider of public
goods. According to their careful analysis of different
surveys in Russia, ‘‘.muchmore signiﬁcant are substantive
expectations that a state, democratic or not, ought to be
able to do a better job in providing such valued public
goods as social order, economic stability, guaranteed
welfare and a greater measure of distributive justice’’.45 In
fact, neither the Soviet nor post-Soviet state met the
expectations of Russia’s citizens satisfactorily, and this
failure led to severe legitimacy crises for the regimes.
After Stalin’s death, (when mass repressions and terror
were no longer used as major tools of political control) the
Soviet regime was faced with the typical ‘‘dilemma of
performance’’ outlined by Samuel Huntington: ‘‘because
their legitimacy was based on performance criteria,
authoritarian regimes lost legitimacy if they did not
perform and also lost it if they did perform.’’46 The
achievements of Soviet modernization, such as industrial-
ization, urbanization, upward mobility and the spread of
higher education led to the emergence of the Soviet
equivalent of an urban middle-class This class began to
challenge the legitimacy of the Soviet system over time due
to its rising expectations and the decline of economic
performance in 1970–1980s.47 Still, the popular dissatis-
faction and low trust in the Soviet regime were not crucial
for the survival of the status quo before Gorbachev’s
reforms due to the lack of available alternatives. However,
the proclamation of political liberalization in the late 1980s
had a subversive effect; not only did democratic regimes
appear as the most attractive alternative to the Soviet
status quo48 but also many Russians (ﬁrst and foremost,
educated urban residents) supported completely demol-
ishing the (already illegitimate) Soviet system, likewise
supporting the subsequent collapse of the state and its
regime in 1991.49 Furthermore, the broad mass support for
political and economic reforms in the early 1990s50 indi-
cated the Soviet system’s illegitimacy51 rather than
a manifestation of legitimacy of newly-emerging post-
Soviet regime.52
Russian citizens’ early hopes that regime change would
be the key to building prosperity53 and a new legitimacy
soon turned into illusions against the dramatic decline in
Russian state capacity over the 1990s. The new regime’s
legitimacy became problematic not only because of
economic hardship, but also because of the lack of the law45 See Sil and Chen (2004, pp. 348–349).
46 See Huntington (1991, p. 55).
47 See Bahry (1993), Melville (1998).
48 See Hahn (1991) Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1994).
49 See McFaul, (2001).
50 See Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1994).
51 See Melville (1998, p.157).
52 See Rose, Mishler and Munro (2006).
53 See Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1994), Melville (1998).
Table 2
Mass evaluations of Soviet and post-Soviet regimes in Russia, 1998.a
Percentage of respondents
attributed regimes as
Soviet era Post-Soviet era
Close to the people 36 2
Legal 32 12
Bureaucratic 30 22
Strong, durable 27 2
Criminal, corrupt 13 63
Alien to the people 8 41
Inconsistent 8 32
Weak, impotent 8 30
Short-sighted 23 28
a See Sil and Chen (2004, p. 358). Adapted from a 1998 nation-wide
VTsIOM survey (N¼ 1500).
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According to survey data, many Russians demanded that
these issues be resolved,54 but the weak Russian state was
unable to do so.55 To put it bluntly, Russia’s post-Soviet
regime was unable to gain the new legitimacy without
building its speciﬁc support. By 1998, even the Soviet
regime, so heavily discredited in Russian eyes in the early
1990s, got comparatively more positive assessments than
the post-Soviet one (see Table 2).
However, the (previously illegitimate) Soviet regime as
a possible alternative to the status quo, in the manner of
‘‘back to the USSR,’’ was also unacceptable to most
Russians. According to the New Russian Barometer survey
data,56 in the 1990s–2000s not more than 36% of Russians
approved of restoring the Communist system, and more
than 60% disapproved of it57 while other alternatives to the
status quo (such as military rule) were even less attractive.
Andrei Melville best captured the inconsistency of public
preferences – negative assessments of the status quo
regime and the low attractiveness of other alternatives – by
noting that Russians would like to combine ‘‘the best of two
worlds:’’ the social guarantees of the Soviet systemwith the
personal freedoms of Western democracies.58 However,
they were not ready to bear the full costs of either of these
regimes. The fragmentation of alternatives on the supply
side of the political system59 as well as the multiplicity of
citizens’ identities on the side of popular demands also
endorsed the status quo regime, despite legitimacy crises.
In sum, the combination of mixed public preferences and
the lack of viable alternatives to the status quo provided
fertile grounds for resigned acceptance; the political
developments of 2000s reinforced these trends.
Against the background of Russia’s oil-induced
economic growth of 2000s, the efforts of Vladimir Putin’s
government to strengthen both the coercive and infra-
structural capacity of the Russian state were welcomed by
most Russians, despite the regime’s many anti-democratic
moves such as limiting media freedom and the like.60
According to the New Russian Barometer survey data61 the
period of 2001 serves as a tipping point: since then, in the
eyes of Russian citizens, positive assessments of Russia’s
current regime have steadily prevailed over negative ones
(Table 3).
The trend of growing support for the current regime
among Russians in 2000s reﬂected the general positive
evaluation of its performance due to improvements in the
living conditions of large segments of the population: many
Russian citizens have enjoyed beneﬁts of the market54 See Levada (2000), Rose and Munro (2002), Colton and McFaul
(2003).
55 See Bova (1999).
56 The project is conducted by the Center for the Study of Public Policy
(UK) and VTsIOM (since 2004 – Levada-Center), Russia’s reputable survey
research ﬁrm. For details, see Rose, Mishler and Munro (2006, pp. 70–75),
for some data, see www.russiavotes.org (access 14 December 2008).
57 See Rose, Mishler and Munro (2006, pp. 94–99).
58 See Melville (1998, p. 156).
59 See Rose (2000), Gel’man (2005).
60 See Sil and Chen, (2004).
61 See Rose, Mishler and Munro, (2006, p. 90).economy due to the rise of real wages and consuming
boom. Not only did international observers view Russia as
a ‘‘normal country’’,62 but Russia’s government also fulﬁlled
some basic popular demands63 so new regime’s speciﬁc
support in 2000s steadily increased over time.64 This
feeling of ‘‘normality’’ is, to a great extent, based upon the
elite-led, top-down imposition of the ‘‘good Soviet Union’’
model. This consists of partially restoring the Soviet style of
government – without Communist rule and a shortage of
goods – with more personal freedoms and a rise in middle-
class well-being, a model close to the ideals of many
Russian citizens.65 However, a close analysis of these trends
in the light of trust in, support for and the legitimacy of the
regime revealed a more nuanced picture.
As various survey data have demonstrated, popular
support for the status quo regime in Russia is heavily based
on Russian citizens’ personal trust in their president Vla-
dimir Putin (and, since 2008, in his successor Dmitrii
Medvedev), rather than on trust in the government and its
institutions. According to VTsIOM/Levada Center surveys,
from 2000 to 2006 Putin’s approval rating ﬂuctuated
between 61% and 84%, while similar ﬁgures for the Russian
government ranged from 25% to 46% (in April 2006–72%
and 30%, respectively), leaving an average conﬁdence gap
of about 40%.66 This conﬁdence gap reﬂected many
Russians’ dissatisfaction with the government’s actual
functioning. For instance, despite urgent demands for ‘‘law
and order’’ among Russia’s citizens,67 an absolute majority
of them expressed deep distrust in courts, police, and other
law enforcement agencies,68 though this was mainly due to
widespread stereotypes, not due to personal experience of
corruption.69 Nowonder that despite the generally positive
assessments of current trends in political developments in
2000s, in 2003–2004 more than half of VTsIOM/Levada
Center survey respondents considered the country’s62 See Shleifer and Treisman (2004).
63 See Sil and Chen (2004).
64 See Rose, Mishler and Munro (2006).
65 See Melville (1998), Levada (2000), Rose, Mishler, and Munro (2006).
66 See Rose, Mishler and Munro (2006, pp. 140–141).
67 See Rose and Munro (2002), Colton and McFaul (2003), Sil and Chen
(2004).
68 See Shlapentokh (2004), Rose, Mishler and Munro (2006, p. 139).
69 See Levada (2006, pp. 233–247).
Table 3
Approval of the current regime in Russia, 1992–2005.a
Percent of respondents Positive rating Negative rating
February 1992 þ14 74
July 1993 þ36 49
March 1994 þ35 48
April 1995 þ26 54
January 1996 þ28 46
July 1996 þ38 47
March 1998 þ36 48
January 2000 þ39 45
April 2000 þ38 49
June 2001 þ47 37
June 2003 þ57 32
December 2003 þ64 25
March 2004 þ65 27
January 2005 þ48 36
Question: ‘‘Here is the scale for evaluating the political system. The top,
þ100, is the best, and the bottom, 100, is the worst. Where on the scale
would you put our current political system?’’.
a Adapted from Rose, Mishler and Munro (2006, p. 90).
Table 4
Election results in Russia, 1993–2004.a
Time Turnout, % Incumbent/pro-
government votes, %
1993, parliamentary 54.3 32.2b
1995, parliamentary 65.7 15.8c
1996, presidential 69.7/68.8d 35.8/54.4
1999, parliamentary 61.7 38.6e
2000, presidential 68.6 52.9
2003, parliamentary 55.7 42.6f
2004, presidential 64.3 71.3
2007, parliamentary 63.7 72.0g
2008, presidential 69.8 70.3
a Sources: www.russiavotes.org; www.electorageography.com (access
14 December 2008).
b Combined vote for Russia’s Choice, Party of Russian Unity and Accord,
Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms and Women of Russia.
c Combined vote for Our Home is Russia, Women of Russia and Ivan
Rybkin Bloc.
d First/second rounds, respectively.
e Combined vote for Unity, Fatherland – All Russia, and Women of
Russia.
f Combined vote for United Russia, Party of Russia’s Rebirth – Russia’s
Party of Life, and People’s Party of Russia.
g Combined vote for United Russia and Just Russia.
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institutional trust has not caused the regime to be
perceived as illegitimate against the background of its
relatively high speciﬁc support. As William Mishler and
Richard Rose noted, ‘‘although trust in political institutions
encourages citizen involvement in politics. it does not
inﬂuence support for the current regime or for plausible.
alternatives’’ See Mishler and Rose (2005, p. 1069). In other
words, the combination of relatively positive assessments
of the current regime and low trust in its institutions has
preserved the trap of ‘‘resigned acceptance’’ in Russia
during the 2000s.
The dynamics of Russian political behavior have also
demonstrated a persistent pattern of resigned acceptance
over time. After 1996, when Boris Yeltsin was dramatically
elected to his second term in ofﬁce,70 incumbents and/or
their parties have never lost national presidential and
parliamentary elections. Since 1999 onward, they have
overwhelmingly dominated the State Duma, the lower
chamber of the legislature, while by mid-2000s the weak,
impotent, and internally divided opposition was about to
extinct.71 Moreover, the principles of competitive politics in
Russia are questioned by its citizens. According to Public
Opinion Foundation (FOM) 2006 survey (N¼ 1500), 47% of
Russians denied the very idea of the party competition.72 In
2004 and 2008, incumbent president, Vladimir Putin and
his successor, Dmitrii Medvedev, got 71.3 and 70.3% of
votes, respectively, while the dominant party, United
Russia, established a super-majority in the legislature to
hold up to 315 out of 450 seats (see Tables 4 and 5). One
might argue that Russian voters endorsed the status quo
regime by pro-incumbent voting.73 Moreover, given the
relative rise of their satisfaction on regime’s performance,70 See White, Rose, and McAllister (1997), McFaul (2001).
71 See Gel’man (2005).
72 For survey data, see http://bd.fom.ru/report/cat/polit/polypar/
dd062523 (access 14 December 2008).
73 See Colton (2000), Rose and Munro (2002), Colton and McFaul
(2003).Russia’s voters remained cynically indifferent to issues of
electoral fraud and unfairness, despite rather widespread
belief that the elections are unfair. According to Levada
Center surveys, after the 1999 parliamentary elections 50%
of Russians evaluated them as ‘‘unfair’’, but in 2003 only
38% of respondents supported this statement; by 2007 the
number of these respondents decreased to 31%74 (para-
doxically, most observers agreed that 2003 and, particu-
larly, 2007 elections were more unfair than those in 1999).
Anyway, on Russia’s electoral arena both ‘‘loyalty’’ and
‘‘exit’’ prevailed over ‘‘voice.’’
Political activism beyond voting reveals a similar
pattern: ‘‘exit’s’’ prevalence over ‘‘voice’’. Even though
many Russians generally approve of the basic idea of
‘‘voice,’’ they were reluctant to join protest actions,75 in
a manner typical of free-riders.76 The most striking wave of
protests swept across the country in January 2005, in the
wake of social beneﬁts reforms which severely affected
retired people and other disadvantaged groups. But it did
not affect most of Russia’s citizens: despite supporting the
protest’s goals,77 the silent majority of Russians remained
de-mobilized. Authorities were able to localize and contain
public discontent rather quickly. A more detail analysis of
regional protest patterns even led to a conclusion that the
mass protest behavior in post-Soviet Russia was merely
a projection of intra-elite struggles.78
To summarize, the consequences of overcoming legiti-
macy crises in the 2000s were two-fold. The relative
improvement of public assessments of the current regime74 For 1999, 2003 and 2007 survey data see http://www.levada.ru/press/
2004011201.html and http://www.levada.ru/press/2007121702.html,
respectively (access 14 December 2008).
75 See Levada (2000, pp. 489–507), Rose, Mishler, and Munro (2006, pp.
82–85).
76 See Olson (1965).
77 See Levada (2006, pp. 129–39).
78 See Robertson (2007).
Table 5
Pro-government parties in the Russian parliament–State Duma (450
seats)a
Convocation Seats of pro government parties and
groups (at the beginning of each
convocation)
% of seats
1993–1995 134 (Party of Russian Unity and Accord – 30,
New Regional Policy – 66, Women of Russia
– 23, Democratic Party of Russia – 15)
29.8
1995–1999 106 (Our Home is Russia – 66,
Russia’s Regions – 40)
23.6
1999–2003 235 (Unity – 81, Fatherland-All Russia – 54,
People’s Deputy – 53, Russia’s Regions – 47)
52.2
2003–2007 310 (United Russia – 310) 68.9
2007–2011 353 (United Russia – 315; Just Russia – 38) 70.0
a Sources: www.russiavotes.org; www.panorama.ru (access 14
December 2008).
V. Gel’man / Journal of Eurasian Studies 1 (2010) 54–63 61has not converted to trust in major state institutions, and
their effectiveness in the eyes of the population is rather
dubious as yet.79 In this sense, Russian citizens’ resigned
acceptance of the status quo regime is still based on the
lack of viable alternatives, not on trust in its institutions.
The process of re-equilibrating Russia into a ‘‘normal
country’’ which demonstrates some patterns of Soviet-style
government without Communist rule brought only
a partial equilibrium, which did not legitimize the regime
in the long run.
4. Dilemmas of legitimacy building: investments
without risk insurance?
From a comparative perspective of post-revolutionary
stabilization, despite unfavorable historical ‘‘legacy’’ and
troubles with legitimacy both before and during regime
transition, Russia’s experience of post-Communist regime
change might be considered to be a ‘‘success story’’.80
Russia’s rulers were able to prevent anti-regime mobiliza-
tion in the ‘‘time of troubles’’ of the 1990s and gain some
support for the status quo in the 2000s. However, at the
moment its success is rather questionable. It is unclear
whether the partial equilibrium of ‘‘resigned acceptance’’ is
stable and, if not, what possible factors which might cause
it to dis-equilibrate: in a sense, the ongoing economic crisis
that began in 2008 might be a crucial test for continuity or
demise of legitimacy of Russia’s regime. Also, the steady
popular support for the status quo regime in Russia has
coincided with the undermining of such basic democratic
institutions as competitive elections, media freedom, and
the like. Besides these major reservations, one might
assume that overcoming legitimacy crises through
‘‘resigned acceptance’’ of the status quo would be the
second choice of any given government, if it could not build
legitimacy for the newly-emerged regime from scratch
upon the collapse of previous (illegitimate) regime. And
should we expect that over time the status quo
regime’s ‘‘resigned acceptance’’ (be it democratic or
non-democratic) will gradually evolve into fully-ﬂedged79 See Sil and Chen (2004), Levada (2006).
80 See Stinchcombe (1999).legitimacy, if this regime demonstrates its long-term
effectiveness, leading the possible alternatives to ﬁnally
become irrelevant?
Two other implications of the Russian experience are
worth further consideration. First, Russia achieved
re-equilibration rather quickly because of the shortage of
supply caused by Kremlin’s reconﬁguration of elites by
‘‘imposed consensus’’, not because of changing popular
demands.81 However, while electoral competition among
elites (which is necessary, though not sufﬁcient for
democracy) was diminished, this makes the status quo
regime vulnerable in terms of gaining legitimacy in the
long run. Under these conditions, the above-mentioned
‘‘dilemma of performance’’ became even more serious. On
the one hand, if the regime performs successfully, subor-
dinated segments of elites as well as disadvantaged social
groups will require redistribution of political power and
wealth, and it will be difﬁcult for Russia’s rulers to satisfy
these demands without meaningful political competition
(unless they will resort to repressions). On the other hand,
if the regime is unable to bring Russia law, order and justice
– i.e., effective state bureaucracy and a relative decline in
inequality – alternatives to the status quo regime may
become more attractive to Russian citizens. Thus, without
successful resolving its ‘‘dilemma of performance,’’ Russia’s
current regime might provoke replacement of the ‘‘exit’’
strategy by ‘‘voice’’. Second, the coexistence of popular
support for the current regime with the lack of trust in its
institutions could have a potentially subversive outcome;
like ﬁrms, regimes might be successful if they attract
investments without risk insurance, but the chances of
their bankruptcy are high. The regime lacks risk insurance
because of the lack of trust in institutions, which is essen-
tial for the development of diffuse support for the regime.
Given Russia’s present situation, the regime faces a risk of
bankruptcy not only from the threat of decline of its
performance but also from the breakdown of the ‘‘imposed
consensus’’ among Russia’s elites, which is based only on
personal trust in leaders rather than trust in institutions,
similar to mass feelings.82
In their turn, Russia’s rulers are well aware of these
challenges, and their responses are oriented at averting the
risks of regime’s de-legitimation. These responses include:
(1) increasing the possible cost of ‘‘voice’’ and thoroughly
eliminating any alternatives to the status quo regime; (2)
building new political institutions and organizations,
which aim to establish ‘‘loyalty’’ among both elites and
ordinary citizens; and (3) attempts to convert popular
support from investments into risk insurance for the
current regime. As yet, the implementation of these poli-
cies led to partial success.
To some extent, institutional engineering has caused the
cost of ‘‘voice’’ in Russia to increase: from 1993 to 2003, the
threshold of parliamentary representation for political
parties was set at 7% instead of 5%, and the organizational
requirements to register parties were also toughened
(registration can be denied at any given moment). A new81 See Gel’man (2003).
82 See Steen (2003, pp. 25–48).
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ﬁrm state control, and media can now be also prosecuted
for ‘‘incorrect’’ contents, in the wake of anti-extremism
campaigns. Even minor manifestations of opposition
movements were brutally attacked by special police forces,
in order to prevent them from spreading across the
country. To a certain degree, these pressures served as pre-
emptive measures against potential anti-regime activities
or as a counter-offensive reaction by Russian authorities to
the wave of ‘‘color revolutions’’ in Georgia, Ukraine, and
Kyrgyzstan in 2003–2005.
Building new political institutions and organizations –
such as the dominant party, United Russia, or loyal pro-
regimeNGO’s –playadual role in the regime’s strategy. In the
short run,potential challengers to the statusquoregimewere
not wiped off the political and social arena, but rather co-
opted, contained and even promoted in exchange for their
loyalty. Thiswasespecially important forRussia’s youngsters:
as of yet, the regime has been more successful in getting
credits among Russia’s youth. Even though gender, ethnicity,
education andplace of residencehave not inﬂuencedRussian
patterns of ‘‘resigned acceptance’’ of the status quo regime,
age matters in this respect. Young Russians are inclined to
support the current regimemore strongly than are their aged
counterparts,83 and they tend to ﬁercely reject alternatives to
the status quo.84 In the long run, successfully building
a dominant party regime in Russia, similar to Mexico under
PRI,might become a source of stability for the status quo due
to the irrelevance of alternatives and possible resolutions of
‘‘dilemma of performance’’. Comparative studies have sug-
gested that dominant party regimes are longest-lived in
comparison with other non-democratic regimes such as
military rule or personalist dictatorships.85 Although Krem-
lin’s chief strategist, Vladislav Surkov, announced that United
Russia should run the country for at least the next 10–15
years,86 it is too early to say whether or not this strategy will
achieve its goal.
Finally, if the newly-emerged political institutions and
organizations perform successfully in the political arena,
they could be instrumental for the current regime in
building institutional trust in addition to trust in the
personalities of leaders like Putin or Medvedev. Yet institu-
tions and organizations could decrease the transaction costs
of converting the regime’s investments in efﬁciency into risk
insurance, which is based on trust. But given the past record
of legitimacy crises and the current trap of resigned accep-
tance, it is difﬁcult to establish institutional trust in a non-
democratic regime, especially with the existing gap between
the pro-democratic aspirations of many Russians and their
critical perceptions of post-Communist realities.87 Whether
or not it is possible to resolve the dilemma of converting
investments into risk insurance for the status quo regime in
Russia remains to be seen; it will depend upon the existence83 See Rose, Mishler and Munro (2006, pp. 108–118).
84 See Mendelson and Gerber (2007).
85 See Geddes (2003, pp. 47–88).
86 See http://old.edinros.ru/print.html?id¼111148 (access 12 May 2008).
87 See Colton and McFaul (2003), Shlapentokh (2004), Rose, Mishler,
and Munro (2006, pp. 126–130).and continuation of long-terms sources of diffuse support
for the non-democratic regime.
Due to thehistoricallyembeddedpersistence of ‘‘exit’’, or
resigned acceptance, and the lack of immediate domestic
challenges, at the moment it is more likely that Russia will
experience a possible dis-equilibration of their current
political regime from above (i.e., at the level of elites) rather
than frombelow (i.e., from ‘‘voice’’ of the citizens). However,
it seemsunclear howlongwill this partial equilibriumof the
status quo survive, what kind of the state and political
regime could ﬁll such a vacuum of resigned acceptance, and
whether or not they will be able to gain legitimacy.
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